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Abstract
Experimental pragmatic studies focus on the cognitive 
processing models of scalar implicature (a general 
conversational implicature). The “[neo]-Gricean,” 
Levinson, infers that the cognitive processing model 
of general conversational implicature is a process 
of cancellation of one literal meaning in the general 
conversational implicature in terms of a “stereotypical 
relation”, which he calls “default model”. However, 
the “post-Gricean” infers that the processing follows 
the “context-driven model”, which holds that the literal 
meaning is only a stimulus to the hearer; it is the context 
that people depend on to process the conversational 
implicature. Countless experimental studies have 
been conducted to find a conclusion, but this issue is 
still unresolved. Another valuable inference about the 
cognitive processing model should be that the cognitive 
processing of contextual meaning is a dynamic interactive 
process among language, ad hoc, and mental contexts. It is 
completed by the interaction of various brain mechanisms 
with the surrounding neural systems as bridges, which are 
a holistic, dynamic, complicated process. 
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1.  ORIGINS OF SCALAR IMPLICATURE
1.1  Horn’s Scale
Grice (1968) made a clear differentiation between “what 
is said” and “what is implicated”, and emphasized the 
difference between a speaker’s literal and implicated 
meaning. Grice also pointed out that conversational 
implicature can be conveyed when a speaker flouted 
the “co-operative principle”, including four maxims, 
one of which is “quantity maxim”. According to Grice, 
people may unconsciously follow the quantity maxim 
in the conversation; that is, the conversation needs to 
offer the required information, no more or less than 
what is necessary (1975). When speakers observe or 
flout the quantity maxim, the related conversational 
implicature can be conveyed. Neo-Gricean Horn (1972) 
established the concept of “scale”, namely, “Horn’s 
scale”. Horn expounded that if there exists the divergence 
of the stronger item and the weaker item in accordance 
with strength among the scale items of a series of the 
same semantic field, they will constitute “scale” with 
a straightforward items (the stronger, the weaker) to 
express. Scaled word class under the “Horn’s scale” 
should fulfill three qualifications: (1) The lexical meaning 
of a stronger item must entail that of a weaker item in 
any sentence structure; (2) The stronger and weaker items 
should have the same part of speech; and (3) The stronger 
and weaker items are both from the same semantic field or 
have the same semantic relations. Based on the definition 
of Horn, Levinson (2001) listed some commonly scaled 
word classes: indefinite pronouns (all, most, many, some, 
few); conjunctions (and, or); numerals (… three, two, 
one); modal verbs (must, should, may); frequency adverbs 
(always, often, sometimes); degree adjectives (hot, warm); 
and verbs (start, finish). On the basis of Grice’s co-
operative principle, if the speaker expressed the weaker 
item, the hearer may think that what the speaker is trying 
to say is no more than the weaker item and naturally 
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cannot be the stronger item. Therefore, if the weaker 
item in Horn’s scale appears within the conversation, the 
related conversational implicature can be generated; that 
is, the weaker item in the expression means to deny the 
stronger item. For instance, if the speaker chose “some” 
of indefinite scales (all, some), then his implicature is 
to deny “all”. Let’s see an example the speaker said the 
following:
(1) Some people outside hold umbrellas. This is its 
conversational implicature:
Not all people outside hold umbrellas.
This implicature conveyed by the scaled word classes 
in conversation is called “scalar implicature”.
1.2  Horn’s Scale and Research Value of Scalar 
Implicature
Why can Horn’s scale become the topic researched by 
many researchers? First, Horn’s scale is naturally present 
in the language, which is a natural corpus and is not 
created by Horn but conducted and generalized by Horn. 
As a natural corpus, it naturally reflects human beings’ 
thinking patterns; therefore, Horn’s scale has not only 
received great attention from linguists but has also been a 
concern of psychologists.
Second, Horn’s scale exists in almost every language. 
Almost all languages have a similar (the stronger, the 
weaker) expression, so it can reflect people’s common 
thinking pattern. Through experiments in multiple 
languages, people can make out whether there is 
commonness in human beings’ language cognitive 
processing model under the conditions of different 
geographical, linguistic, and cultural environments.
Third, for a long time psychological linguists have not 
come to an agreement about people’s cognitive language 
processing model. At present, two kinds of controversy 
primarily exist; namely the “context-driven model” and 
the “default model”. As such, Horn’s scalar implicature 
processing becomes the significant experimental basis of 
testing the two models. In fact, there are many methods 
based on scalar implicature, one of which is the “upper-
bound or lower-bound context” processing experimental 
method (Bezuidenhout & Morris, 2004; Breheny et 
al., 2006). This approach infers that if the cognitive 
processing model is a “context-driven model”, then in 
the upper-bound context (the context that supports the 
generation of scalar implicature), the reading time of 
“stimulus fragments” (the fragments including the weaker 
items) is obviously shorter than that in the lower-bound 
context (the context that does not support the generation 
of scalar implicature). If it is the default model, there 
should be no significant difference between them (see 
the specific experimental system in the second section). 
Possibly people’s cognitive language processing model 
is neither of the two and other possibilities might exist. 
These can probably be inferred through the experimental 
study of scalar implicature. 
2 .  D I S C U S S I O N  O F  S C A L A R 
IMPLICATURE COGNITIVE MODEL
“The Classic Gricean school”, “the neo-Gricean school” 
and “the post-Gricean school” hold different opinions 
regarding scalar implicature. From Grice’s point of view, 
when a particular context is needed in understanding a 
conversation, “particularized conversational implicature” 
can be identified, whereas, when no additional specific 
context is needed to convey meaning, and “generalized 
conversational implicature” can be calculated. The 
debate about the implicature cognitive model focuses 
on generalized conversational implicature. The Classic 
Gricean school argued that though the context is the key 
point of inferring the conversational implicature, the literal 
meaning also plays a significant role; besides, Grice’s 
“co-operative principle” and “four maxims” are the basic 
principles of inferring the implicature, and processing 
scalar implicature does not need the context; in other 
words, the literal meaning can also convey GCI without 
the context. Neo-Grecian school (Bach & Harnish, 1979; 
Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2001) is fundamentally consistent 
with “the Classic school”, but the foci of their theories are 
different. The neo-Gricean Levinson’s “three heuristics” 
were reduced from Grice’s “four maxims”, while 
Levinson’s “three heuristics” give more consideration to 
GCI, one of which is informativeness, the central principle 
used to convey and infer scalar implicature. The basic 
difference between the Classic Grice school and the neo-
Gricean school is the emphasis on GCI. The post-Gricean 
school (Carston, 1991; 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 2001) 
proposes relevance theory and denies the function and 
significance of the literal meaning in cognitive processing. 
Post-Gricean holds that the conversation is to offer a 
stimulus or a contextual “relevance” between literal 
meaning and implicature, and the hearer tries to directly 
understand implicature based on this relevant information 
(Carston, 2002).
Sca la r  impl ica tu re  i s  a  pa r t  o f  genera l i zed 
conversational implicature. The Classic Gricean school, 
the neo-Gricean school, and the post-Gricean school 
infer the processing model of scalar implicature based 
on their own theory. The Classic Gricean school and the 
neo-Gricean school hold that while understanding scalar 
implicature, the hearer first unconditionally understands 
the literal meaning and then infer scalar implicature 
according to the context. Levinson (2001) suggested 
that scalar implicature, the inference of GCI, is based 
on “conventionalized experience”; that is, there exists 
a “default” meaning in people’s brains. The so-called 
“default model” means that the inference of implicature 
is to cancel the default conventionalized implicature. 
However, the post-Gricean school contends that while 
the hearer understands scalar implicature, the literal 
meaning is just a stimulus to the hearer; the hearer 
needs the specific context to directly understand scalar 
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implicature—namely, particularized conversational 
implicature and generalized conversational implicature 
(including scalar implicature). This is called the “context-
driven model”.
With the development and deepening of the study, 
in addition to these two models, many scholars have 
proposed new assumptions and inference associated with 
the cognitive model of scalar implicature. For example, 
some researchers tend to choose between the default 
model and context-driven model—the “standard” model 
(Bach & Harnish, 1979).They think that the context 
that scale items appear, scale items and conveyed scalar 
implicature can be stored as a whole. As the context 
reserve of the same word class increases, one context or 
some contexts, and scalar implicature is often extracted. 
With the increase in the number of extraction, this one 
or some context and scalar implicature can become the 
most active combination. Then, when the participants 
come across scale items that belong to this or these 
most active combination, they will deal with them 
immediately; If those scale items just in accordance 
with the context and scalar implicature that participants 
encounter, then the processing time may be very short 
and even reach “standard”. However, if they do not 
match, then the participants will extract from the reserve 
other combinations with the context and related scalar 
implicature; the processing time will be longer, and it may 
produce the effect similar to the “context-driven model”. It 
can be easily seen that this view has a lot in common with 
“connectionism” in neuropsychology and neurolinguistics, 
especially in that they treat their language and language-
related experience as pragmatic reserves and extractions.
Katsos (2011) mentioned that he had made an 
[informativeness] tolerance hypothesis on the basis of his 
research on children’ scalar implicature cognition. The 
“tolerance” refers to the pragmatic tolerance—namely, 
in the conversation, the pragmatic expression of the 
speaker does not meet the needs of the hearer, and the 
hearer cannot accept it and then make a satisfactory reply. 
“Informativeness tolerance” means that the information 
the speaker provided is insufficient or excessive; the 
hearer cannot understand the implicated meaning and 
provide a satisfactory response. Here is an example:
(2) A: Are there fish dishes in the canteen today?
B: There are poached fish.
In Dialogue (2), B’s answer provided too much 
information; the answer “yes” will suffice. However, A 
can accept this additional information; therefore, tolerance 
existed. But in (3), the information B provided was 
insufficient, and A was dissatisfied. In the study, this is 
called low tolerance:
(3) A: Your dress is so beautiful How much?
B: Not expensive.
Katsos’ experimental (2011) results are as follows: 
Although children, as the speaker and the hearer, have 
the same ability as adults but in the task of only “right 
and wrong” judgment, children exhibit tolerance of 
“under-informative”. Due to strong tolerance, children’s 
understanding of the implicated meaning is inaccurate; 
therefore, it  can be inferred that as the hearers, 
children’s understanding of the implicated meaning is 
poorer than adults.
3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE 
MODEL EXPERIMENTS OF SCALAR 
IMPLICATURE
3.1  Off-Line Experiment Model
Cognitive model experiments of scalar implicature 
originated from off-line experiments, and the main 
representatives are Gibbs and Moise (1997) and Nicolle 
and Clark (1999). Gibbs and Moise’s experiments (1997) 
included four small experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 do 
not involve context, while Experiments 3 and 4 involve 
context. In all of the experiments, subjects first accept 
categorization training of what is said versus what is 
implicated and then enter the test. Subjects are required 
to read a sentence or paragraph and then complete a 
task: “choose the implicated meaning according to what 
the speaker says”. A small part of the materials involves 
scale items, such as “everyone” and “nobody”. The 
result shows that, in the absence of the specific context, 
subjects tend to only choose an “enriched” interpretation 
but do not choose a minimal interpretation; yet, in the 
specific context, subjects are more likely to choose “what 
is implicated”. Therefore, the researcher concluded 
that in the understanding of “what is implicated”, the 
conversational context plays an important role. Nicolle 
and Clark (1999) partly repeated Gibbs and Moise’s 
experiment (1997), but came to an opposite conclusion. 
Although only some materials in these two experiments 
are scale items, Bezuidenhout and Cutting (1002), as well 
as other scholars, keenly captured the obvious research 
value and controllability of scale items in the experiments.
3.2  On-Line Experimental Model
Online experiments can be achieved through a variety 
of techniques; at present, the most commonly used 
means is the reaction time tests. Superlab and DMDX 
are commonly used software. The instruments that are 
more accurate than reaction time test are the specialized 
equipment, such as eye tracking and ERP (event-
related brain potential instrument). The following will 
respectively review online experiments of the cognitive 
model of scalar implicature from several aspects.
3.2.1  Self-Paced Reading Time Experiment 
Self-paced reading time experiments can also be 
divided into stimulus items (scale items) and target 
items (items associated with scale items) reading time 
experiments. Some experiments will treat stimulus 
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items as the key point; for example, in Bezuidenhout 
and Cutting’s (2002) research, the researchers treat 
“some” as observed scale items, design the upper-
bound and lower-bound contexts, and compare the 
reading time of stimulus items that include “some” 
in these two contexts. The results of Bezuidenhout 
and Cutting’s experiments are consistent with their 
“context-driven model” hypothesis; that is, the reading 
time of stimulus items in the upper-bound context is 
obviously shorter than that in the lower-bound context. 
In addition, some experiments will treat target items as 
the key point; for example, if Katsos simply examines 
the reading time of the stimulus items, there are many 
drawbacks, such as the researchers being unable to 
rule out the impact of readers’ reading habits, personal 
interests, and other factors. Therefore, Breheny et al. 
(2006), as well as Katsos (2008), not only tested the 
reading time of the stimulus items (some) but also 
tested the reading time of the target items (the rest). 
In other words, researchers treat the items associated 
with the scale items as the key points and test them. 
Breheny et al. (2006) examined the impact of “neutral 
context” (that is, irrelevant to the target items) to the 
cont promotes the induction of scalar implicature. 
The author thinks that this also reflects the drawback 
that takes purely linguistic context as experimental 
materials; that is, linguistic ext: that is, whether items 
scale is highlighted or not, the position of scale items 
in the sentence and its impact on scalar implicature. 
The following is an example:
(4) Some consultants and the director had a meeting, 
and the rest did not attend.
(5) Only some consultants and the director had a 
meeting, and the rest did not attend.
(6) The director and some consultants had a meeting, 
and the rest did not attend.
(7) The director only had a meeting with some 
consultants, and the rest did not attend.
In Example (4), scale items (some) is at the beginning 
of the sentence, which is head-highlighted; in Example 
(5), scale items (some) are at the beginning of the 
sentence, which is also head-highlighted, and “only” is 
also highlighted at the same time. In Example (6), scale 
items (the rest) are at the end of the sentence, which is 
not entirely highlighted. In Example (7), scale items are 
at the end of the sentence, and “only” are highlighted. 
The difference between these materials is that they are 
in different positions, and, therefore, the context of these 
observations belongs to linguistic context (or called 
context). The researchers use highlighted ways to change 
the context and then observe changes of subjects’ reading 
time of the fragment (the rest). InDesigns (4) and (5), 
subjects have sufficient time to deal with scale items, 
but in (6) and (7), since scale items are at the end of the 
sentence, subjects do not have sufficient time to process. 
Therefore, according to the context-driven model, the 
assumption that the author made was that the reading time 
of (6) and (7) was significantly longer than that of (4) and 
(5). The results prove that the reading time of (6) is indeed 
significantly longer than that of (4) and (5), thus proving 
the context-driven model. However, the reading time of (7) 
was significantly shorter than that of (4) and (5), and this 
is contrary to the context-driven model. The researchers 
inferred that highlighting “only” promotes the induction 
of scalar implicature. The author thinks that this also 
reflects the drawback that takes a purely linguistic context 
as experimental materials; that is, linguistic context is 
often subject to the readers’ reading habits and reading 
attention. Assume that readers of some language focus 
on the content of not the beginning but the end of the 
sentence; then, the reading time of the structure similar to 
(4) and (5) is longer than that of (6) and (7). Therefore, the 
author prefers to use realistic situational context (instead 
of context) as material so that people can better observe 
the processing model of scalar implicature in the realistic 
communicative situation. 
3.2.2  Reaction Time Experiment
The scalar implicature is cancelable (Katsos, 2008; Liu, 
2008), meaning that the scalar implicature of scaled word 
class (some, but not all) can be canceled by speech or 
act after its generation. For instance, in sentence (1), the 
speaker could add “And maybe all people hold umbrellas” 
after saying “Some people outside hold umbrellas.” In 
this way, the latter utterance cancels the conversational 
implicature of the previous one (not all). Experimental 
results of post-Gricean researchers prove that if the 
generation of scalar implicature observes the context-
driven model, the comprehension of scalar implicature 
will not be time-consuming. Breheny et al. (2006) 
deduced from experiments that if the context-driven 
model is the cognitive processing model, it could be 
time-consuming in the context (the upper-bound context) 
by upholding the comprehension of scalar implicature 
since the cancellation of the implicature will affect the 
understanding process. On the other hand, it will not 
consume too much time and will have no impact on 
the understanding process in the context (lower-bound 
context) objecting to the scalar implicature comprehension 
or in the context (neutral context) that has no relation to the 
scalar implicature comprehension. If the default reasoning 
model is the cognitive processing model, in whatever context, 
the cancellation of scalar implicature has an impact on the 
comprehension process; therefore, it will be time-consuming.
Bezuidenhout and Morris (2004) devised the following 
corpora in their experiment:
(8) Some books have color pictures. Actually, all books 
have color pictures, so teachers all like them. (Testing Item 1)
(9) Many books have color pictures. Actually, all books have 
color pictures, so teachers all like them. (Comparing Item 1)
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(10) Those books have color pictures. Actually, all 
books have color pictures, so teachers all like them. 
(Comparing Item 2)
(11) At least some books have color pictures. Actually, 
all books have color pictures, so teachers all like them. 
(Comparing Item 3)
Subjects are observed in regard to their “eyeball 
fixation duration” at the position of “all” and “all have” 
while reading these sentences in the experiment. The 
reason for the observation of “eyeball fixation duration” 
at these two fragments is that according to the default 
reasoning model, when reading the “some” in the first 
part of Sentence (8), the subject has the scalar implicature 
“not all,” and then reading the “all” in the last part of 
the sentence, the subject might feel the possibility of 
canceling the implicature of “not all”; when continuing 
to read “all have,” the subject would complete the 
cancellation. Therefore, “all” in the context impels the 
“preparation” of cancellation of the subject whereas “all 
have” leads to the “completion” of the cancellation and 
the understanding of the implicature “maybe all.” From 
this, it can be inferred whether the subject completed the 
cancellation by testing the “eyeball fixation duration” at 
these two fragments. Besides, by comparing the “eyeball 
fixation duration” of the “some” in Sentence (8) and the 
two fragments in the Sentences (9), (10), and (11), it 
can be deduced whether the “cancellation” takes place 
in reading the sentence (8). The experimental result 
shows that the “eyeball fixation duration” in reading 
the sentence (8) is obviously longer than that in reading 
the Sentences (10) and (11), which illustrates that when 
reading the “some” in the previous sentence, the subject 
has a “default” implicature: namely, “not all.” However, 
then the “all” appears and he would spend some time 
“preparing” to cancel “not all,” and thus, it takes a 
longer time to react when compared with reacting to 
the previous sentence without “some.” And next, the 
cancellation is completed after reading “all have.” It will 
be faster to cancel under the prepared condition, but the 
experimental result of Bezuidenhout and Morris (2004) 
revealed that the time consumed in reading “all” in 
Sentence (8) is obviously shorter than that in reading the 
Sentences (10) and (11), which is contrary to the default 
model deduction. Thereafter, they concluded that their 
experimental result violates the default reasoning model. 
In the meanwhile, they noticed that the reaction time in 
reading “all have” in Sentence (10) is obviously longer 
than that in (8) and (9), and deduced that the subject has 
the feeling of repetition in meaning when he reads “all 
have” and therefore consumes more time. We believe 
that their deduction is not convincing enough, and there 
should be other factors besides the context of producing 
an effect on the comprehension of scalar implicature. We 
need to carry out meticulous and intensive experimental 
research on the cognitive processing model of scalar 
implicature in terms of multifactorial effects. 
3.2.3  Reaction Time to True or False Judgment 
Experiment
Recording the reaction time to true or false items is one of 
the most common in scalar implicature experiments. The 
model involves these elements: (1) Setting the role for 
the subject. The subject can be the speaker, the hearer, 
or the third party (Katsos & Bishop, 2011); (2) The 
subject is required to judge the materials heard through 
the tasks of “true or false judgment” or “grading”; 
judging whether the corpus is true or false (true or 
false judgment or grading according to a 5-point scale) 
(Katsos & Bishop, 2011); and (3) Recording the reaction 
time of the subject. Katsos and Bishop (2011) selected 
a corpus with excessive information, with moderate 
information, and with insufficient information and asked 
the subject to respectively judge true or false as speaker, 
hearer, and the third party. Another difference of Katsos’ 
serial experiments from other experiments on the 
cognitive processing model of scalar implicature is that 
he compared the pragmatic competence of children and 
adults and attempted to test if the pragmatic competence 
is developed rather than innate. For example, in the 
study conducted by Katsos and Bishop (2011), the 
child subject was shown a picture and asked to judge 
whether the speech was “true” or “false.” There were 
four objects in the picture: pineapple, toothbrush, frog, 
and five-pointed star. The speaker said, “Please give 
me the new toothbrush” (with excessive information). 
Different from adults, children tend to judge “true.” At 
the same time, the experiment used the same picture 
and speech and asked children to grade according to a 
five-point scale. Similar to adults, children generally 
gave a grade of fewer than 3 points, which demonstrates 
that the pragmatic competence of children, no matter 
as a hearer, a speaker, or a third party, is the same as 
that of adults; the only difference is that children show 
more tolerance toward pragmatic misuse with excessive 
information. Katsos was once a proponent of the context-
driven model (Breheny et al., 2006), but later his 
published experimental reports showed that he attempted 
to jump out of constraints of the context-driven model 
and default model to carve a new way to probe into the 
cognitive processing model of scalar implicature. In fact, 
he did not refuse these two models but instead approach 
studies from a new perspective. We can infer that the 
reason why he transformed his point of view is that he is 
more a psychologist to probe into the cognitive features 
of human beings through a scaled word class corpus; it 
is more likely that he believed that the factors affecting 
the deduction of scalar implicature are not restricted to 
the context-driven model or default model but are a part 
of a multi-dimensional, multi-factorial, and dynamic 
processing model.
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3.2.4  Eye Movement Experiment
The result of the eye movement experiment is more 
convincing because it employs advanced equipment: an 
eye tracker. The experiment conducted by Bezuidenhout 
and Morris (2004) in 3.2.2 is a classic eye movement 
experiment using an eye tracker to record the eye fixation 
duration in reading a corpus containing scaled word class. 
Besides, there are other experiments, like the experiment 
conducted by Huang and Snedeker (2009), test the eye 
movement based on “read-back” phenomena or on the 
scaled word class corpus in combination with pictures.
3.2.5  ERP Experiment
With the development of science and technology, 
neuroelectrical instruments, especially event related 
potentials (ERP), are employed in the scalar implicature 
experiment. Up until now, many researchers have made 
efforts, such as Noveck and Posada (2003), Kounios 
and Holcomb (1992), Kutas and Van٠Patten (1994), and 
Wu and Tan (2009). Researchers mainly observed the 
cognitive condition of subjects through N400 brain wave 
generated when they processed the scaled word class. The 
researching mechanisms have varied: some only observed 
the change of context, like Noveck and Posada (2003), 
and some tests were conducted with the combination of 
speech and pictures, like Wu and Tan (2009). Take Noveck 
and Posada (2003) as an example: They compared changes 
in the N400 brain wave of subjects under the conditions 
of semantic correctness, semantic error, and insufficient 
pragmatic information when they dealt with “some.” They 
inferred that if the brain wave amplitude is greater in 
dealing with scalar implicature than with literal meaning, 
it reveals that it takes more time to process scalar 
implicature than literal meaning; if not, it will not take 
more time. The experiment demonstrated that under the 
condition of insufficient scalar implicature information, 
no greater N400 wave amplitude is generated; therefore, 
researchers have come to the conclusion that it will 
not take more time to deal with scale implicature than 
with literal meaning and that when people process 
conversational implicature, it is unnecessary to process 
literal meaning prior to the implicature. According to 
their inference, text items are just stimulus to the brain 
cognition, and the brain receiving the stimulus processes 
conversational implicature directly.
However, we do not fully agree with their deduction 
and conclusion: Conversational implicature is not directly 
processed without dealing with literal meaning. We infer 
that literal meaning needs processing. If text items are 
just a stimulus, why is there no understanding of meaning 
arising when confronted with unknown forms, as someone 
having no knowledge about German sees it? 
ERP can directly reflect the cognitive process of the 
human mind, which is exceptionally advantageous to 
study the semantic cancellation and the cognitive process 
of scaled word class in various contexts. We should apply 
this scientific experimental method to probe into the 
cognitive processing model of the implicature. 
CONCLUSION
In order to set up the cognitive processing model of scalar 
implicature and to reveal the secrets of the processing 
model of utterance, researchers have made efforts 
to discover the basis through experimental scientific 
methods consisting of online and offline experiments. 
But, it is evident from contradictory experimental results 
that the cognitive processing model of scalar implicature 
is neither of the two models mentioned above. That is 
to say, the cognitive processing model is by no means a 
single and fixed model and meanwhile, it can be inferred 
that the model will be at least affected by the mental 
context, cognitive experience, pragmatic misuse tolerance, 
knowledge background and cognitive load of the subject. 
For instance, while the brain functions of everybody are 
exactly the same, their brain structures are quite different. 
For instance, 100 human brains with pain function have 
various pain sensitivities.
Human beings and human brains are part of the 
ecological environment, and their cognitive mechanism of 
language meaning must have ecological characteristics: 
holistic, dynamic, interactive, and environmental. 
Language itself is holistic since its speech sounds, 
vocabulary, grammar, meaning, and pragmatic use 
(including context) are a dynamic entirety. Besides 
the semantic cognitive mechanism, the brain cognitive 
mechanism contains knowledge, emotion, personality, 
nature, social culture, and other cognitive mechanisms 
which constitute a dynamic entirety as well. The entirety 
is not in a fixed condition: it is intrinsically changeable. 
Within or between entireties (including other people), 
interactions or mutual modifications continuously take 
place and evolve into the best condition for survival. 
Additionally, these entireties and their environment 
(including people) are supplementary to each other: 
the environment influences them, they transform the 
environment, and finally they come into an ecological 
harmony. The nature of this ecological thinking is 
consistent with the proposition of the second-generation 
cognitive science: cognition is an interactional unity of 
brain, body and environment.
If the use of scaled words occurs in a realistic 
context, all the parts of the holistic utterance and 
its realistic context (including people) and other 
cognitive mechanisms form a large, complicated web 
and interact with one another. Before finding the best 
scalar implicature, the web is still dynamic and thus it 
is possible to add or cancel some implicature. And, it is 
also the reason why the generation of scalar implicature 
is time-consuming.
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In terms of the cognition of language meaning, if it 
is not under the condition of a realistic context, all the 
parts of the holistic language (speech sounds, syntax, 
and semantics), and the mental context of human 
beings, which is the ample mental images stored in the 
psychological space of language users in the process 
of studying and experiencing in the past, interact with 
each other and generate the cognition of certain sentence 
meaning. Thereafter, the single sentence containing 
a scaled word generates the scalar implicature of this 
scaled word, and there exists the scalar implicature at the 
semantic level.
The way we postulate the cognitive processing 
model of language meaning is not completely by 
default-reasoning model or by context-driven model. 
On the  contrary,  the  cogni t ive  processing of  a 
contextual meaning is a dynamic interactive process 
among language, ad hoc, and mental contexts. It 
is completed by the interaction of various brain 
mechanisms with the surrounding neural systems as 
bridges. Rather than linear or parallel, the processing 
procedure is stereoscopic and complex. 
At any rate, human beings continue to explore 
and progress on the way to unveiling the secrets of 
the cognitive processing mechanism of language. 
The cognitive processing model of scalar implicature 
is just like a window through which we can catch a 
glimpse of the cognitive processing mechanism of 
language and have a better understanding of the nature 
of language and even of the mysteries of the human 
brain. Therefore, it deserves the painstaking efforts of 
countless researchers and greater attention within the 
circle of linguistics. 
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